Non-malleability is an important security property of commitment schemes. The property means security against the man-in-themiddle attack, and it is defined and proved in the simulation paradigm using the corresponding simulator. Many known non-malleable commitment schemes have the common drawback that their corresponding simulators do not work in a straight-line manner, requires rewinding of the adversary. Due to this fact, such schemes are proved non-malleable only in the stand-alone cases. In the multiple-instances setting, i.e., when the scheme is performed concurrently with many instances of itself, such schemes cannot be proved non-malleable. The paper shows an efficient commitment scheme proven to be non-malleable even in the multiple-instances setting, based on the KEA1 and DDH assumptions. Our scheme has a simulator that works in a straight-line manner by using the KEA1-extractor instead of the rewinding strategy. key words: commitment scheme, non-malleability, the KEA1 assumption, extractability 1. Introduction
Introduction

Commitment Schemes and Its Non-malleability
A commitment scheme, which is one of the most fundamental cryptographic protocols, is a two-party two-phase protocol:
Commit phase:
A sender, through some interactions with a receiver if necessary, makes a commitment c = com(m; r) to a message m with some randomness r and sends it to the receiver.
Open phase:
The sender sends a decommit information m, r of c to the receiver. The receiver determines the validity of m, r by checking c = com(m; r). If valid, it accepts m (else rejects).
(In the paper, we focus on a string commitment rather than a bit commitment.) Fundamental requirements for a commitment scheme are hiding and binding properties. It is hiding when commitments c = com(m; r) are indistinguishable among different m's, and it is binding when it is infeasible to generate a commitment which can be correctly opened by distinct messages at once. Dolev et al. [7] defines non-malleability (NM) of a commitment scheme, which means security against the man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack. Suppose an adversary A is in the MIM-setting, i.e., A is in the middle of honest left and right parties. A commitment scheme is called nonmalleable when an adversary A, given a commitment c to a message m from the left party, cannot generate a commitment c * to another distinct message m * , which is in some polynomially-computable relation R with m, for the right party. Here, A is supposed to get an open message m, r of c from the left party when it attempts to open c * to m * to the right party. (Strictly, this is non-malleability with respect to opening. When A is supposed only to commit, i.e., not given the decommitment m, r and not required to open c * , it is called non-malleability with respect to commitment. In this paper, we focus on non-malleability with respect to opening.)
To prove non-malleability, we need a simulator S im of A's behavior. S im, alone without any help from the left party (especially without any knowledge of c, m, r), must generate a commitment c * to m * which has a relation R with m with the same probability as in the case of A in the MIMsetting.
Known Non-malleable Commitment Schemes
There are some known non-malleable commitment schemes. Crescenzo et al. [2] constructed a non-interactive and nonmalleable commitment scheme. Unfortunately, the resulting commitments are large (i.e., O(|m|k)-bit with the message length |m| and the security parameter k). Crescenzo et al. [3] and Fischlin and Fischlin [8] , respectively, enhanced DL (discrete-logarithm) based Pedersen's commitment scheme [11] into ones with equivocality and extractability, and give efficient non-malleable commitment schemes.
One common drawback among those efficient nonmalleable schemes is the fact that their corresponding simulators do not work in a straight-line manner, requires rewinding of the adversary. Due to this fact, such schemes are proved non-malleable only in the stand-alone cases. In the multiple-instances setting, i.e., when the scheme is performed concurrently with many instances of itself, such schemes cannot be proved non-malleable. In such a setting, one rewinding of A recursively invokes another rewinding of A, which recursively invokes another rewinding..., eventually results in super-polynomial time simulation.
Damgård and Nielsen [6] show a universally composable (in particular, non-malleable in the multiple-instances setting) commitment scheme, which is as efficient as nonmalleable schemes by [3] , [8] . The key point of the scheme is the use of the trapdoor discrete logarithm problem. The trapdoor of the DLP (corresponding to the scheme's Common Reference String (CRS)) enables extractability without rewinding and leads to a straight-line simulator and UC-secureness of their scheme. Unfortunately, the trapdoor DLP needs a non-standard assumption, called the psubgroup assumption. A more serious problem with the scheme is that the scheme requires a very strong trust in the third party who provides the CRS of the scheme. More precisely, the CRS of the scheme consists of the following pieces of information:
Here, N is the system-wide modulus of the form N = P 2 Q with large primes P and Q, and EK i is the (public) key to be used for making commitments for party P i . That is, all parties using this protocol work in the same modulus N with tailored commitment keys for each of them. (So, the length of CRS is proportional to the number of parities involved.) Now suppose that the third party gets corrupted and the primes P and Q are known to the adversary. Then, the adversary can extract all of the messages under all of the commitments among all of the parities using the P and Q, just as he/she can decrypt ciphertexts using the (master) secret key. This means that the scheme requires a very strong trust in the third party providing the CRS, and once the third party gets corrupted all of the security of the scheme collapses catastrophically.
Our Result
We show another efficient DL-based commitment scheme. Our scheme is the first straight-line extractable commitment scheme based on the KEA1 assumption. Although our scheme may not be UC-secure, it is proven to be nonmalleable even in the multiple-instances setting, using the straight-line extractor. Our simulator works in a straightline manner by using the KEA1-extractor.
The KEA1 assumption is non-standard like the psubgroup assumption used in [6] . Moreover, the KEA1 can be said "more non-standard," since it is of non-black-box type, i.e., the assumption depends on the code of the adversary. However, we believe especially when all (comparable) schemes we have are proved secure only under nonstandard assumptions, it is desirable to have several schemes proved under different non-standard assumptions, since each of non-standard assumptions can collapse accidentally due to its non-standard property. So, it should be meaningful to have another new commitment scheme proved under the KEA1 assumption. More constructively, the use of KEA1 assumption brings us the following merit.
As an advantage compared to the scheme of [6] , our scheme can avoid the above-mentioned catastrophic collapse of security by corrupting the third party providing the CRS. The advantage is the effect of the KEA1 assumption that enables extractability not only without rewinding but also without having any system-wide master trapdoor. In fact, in our scheme, even if trapdoors of CRS become known to the adversary, the adversary cannot extract messages under commitments. It is because the adversary cannot obtain non-black-box access to honest parties as the simulator does against adversaries in the proof of security. Note that to use KEA1-extractor one needs non-black-box access to the target.
Our commitment scheme satisfies the following theorem: 
Definitions
First, we recall the definition of non-malleability of a com-mitment scheme in the "strong" CRS model, and the definition of the KEA1 assumption. 
with some negligible function .
The above definition of the non-malleability of commitment schemes is the standard one (used in, e.g., [3] , [8] ) with the exception that we are using a "strong" CRS model, that is, CRS's are randomly and independently chosen for the left and right sessions. The strong CRS model is common in UC-setting, as used in the scheme of [6] . On the while, note that schemes of [3] , [8] use a "weak" CRS model, where a single CRS is shared among the two sessions. As seen later, our commitment scheme is nonmalleable only in the strong CRS model, not in the weak CRS model. We believe there are scenarios where the strong CRS model is meaningful, for example, the case where some portions of CRS are prepared for every receivers, as in [6] .
A commitment scheme is called non-malleable in multiple-instance setting when it is non-malleable even if many instances of the commitment scheme are performed concurrently in the presence of the MIM adversary A. The adversary A receives polynomially-many commitments c 1 ,..,c n from left parties and manages to make relating commitments c
The KEA1 Assumption
The KEA1 assumption [1] , [9] for group G = g means that it is possible only when one knows b to generate a pair (g b , g ab ) for a randomly selected g a .
Definition 2 (The KEA1 Assumption [1] 
G is called to satisfy the KEA1 assumption if for any w and any adversary H there exists an extractor H
* with the negligible Adv
Our Commitment Scheme
We describe our commitment scheme and show its hiding and binding properties. The proposed scheme uses a technique similar to a "twin encryption technique" [4] , [12] and uses {q, g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 , σ} as CRS. The q in the CRS is a prime order of group G with a generator g. We assume the KEA1 assumption for G. The rest of CRS are generated as follows:
σ is CRS for a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument
Commitment: S commits to message m(∈ Z q ) for R as follows:
S computes:
Decommitment: S opens the commitment to R canonically:
1. S sends m, r to R.
R verifies all of the equations
It is easily seen that one can commit to a k-bit message with O(k) bits in O(k 3 ) computations with the scheme, using, e.g., an efficient NIZK scheme compile(P eqdlog ) of [5] as Π.
Lemma 1. Under the DDH assumption, the proposed scheme is computationally hiding.
Proof. (Sketch) Among all the messages from S to R, those depending on
and
By the soundness of ZK argument system Π, we see that there are 
As in the case of Pedersen's commitment scheme [11] , we see the scheme is computationally binding under the DLA.
Equivocality and Extractability of the Scheme
We show the equivocality and extractability of our scheme. The former is used to simulate the left party against the adversary in MIM-setting, while the latter is used to extract the committed message from the adversary's commitment for the right party in the proof of non-malleability of the scheme. We use the following simple fact: If and only if we have log g 0 h 0 log
Equivocality
First, we show equivocality of the scheme, that is, there is a simulator S im that can generate, using some trapdoor information on the CRS, commitments for adversary A, which can be opened by any messages later.
S im generates an equivocal commitment for adversary A as follows. Suppose A, playing the role of receiver, sends the first message j 0 , k 0 , j 1 , k 1 , π 0 , π 1 to S im. After verifying the validity of proofs π 0 and π 1 , S im computes:
Note the only difference between the simulated commitment and the honest one is in the generation of a 2 : the simulated a 2 satisfies a relation a 2 
1 a 1 with a 1 , but the real a 2 is independently random. We show in the proof of Theorem 1 A cannot distinguish between simulated commitments and real commitments under the DDH assumption.
It is easily seen that the simulated commitment is opened by any message m. In fact, since
. Moreover, by the soundness of the proofs π 0 , π 1 , we have log
Extractability
Second, we show the extractability of the scheme, that is, there is a simulator S im which can extract a message m from an adversary's commitment using some trapdoor information on the CRS.
Let g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 , σ denote the CRS of the scheme. We assume a simulator S im knows discrete logarithms e 1 , d 0 , d 1 among them:
. Suppose S im, simulating a receiver, honestly sends the first message to an adversary A who plays a sender's role, i.e., S im randomly chooses b 0 , b 1 ∈ Z * q , and computes
On the condition that the commitment should be opened correctly, we have equalities
and there must be m, r such that
In the above, S im sends a randomly selected j 1 to A and A returns to S im (g 1 , j 1 ) which constitute a DH-tuple (g 1 , j 1 , g 1 , j 1 ) by Eq. (1). That is, A is seen as playing the role of the KEA1-adversary against S im. So, using the corresponding KEA1-extractor, S im can extract a 1 satisfying
Here, note that α = β happens with only a negligible probability, because if α = β then g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 1/a 1 constitute a DH-tuple and A should violate CDH assumption. (If the same CRS was used among the left and right sessions in the MIM-setting, A could reuse the h 1 , which was generated by S im in the left session, also in the right session, and then the fact α = β (in the right session) doesn't imply the violation of CDH assumption. This is why we need the strong CRS model.)
Since log j 0 j 1 = log g 0 g 1 = e 1 , log j 0 k 0 = log g 0 h 0 = d 0 and log j 1 k 1 = log g 1 h 1 = d 1 , using the same α, β, S im gets also
Thus, S im can compute g
Using the corresponding KEA1-extractor, S im can extract the message m.
Non-malleability of the Commitment Scheme
Now we show the main theorem: Theorem 1. Under the KEA1 and DDH assumptions, the commitment scheme is non-malleable in the strong CRS model. Moreover, the simulator works straight-line in the strict-polynomial time.
Since our simulator works straight-line without rewinding, the following corollary is immediate from the theorem:
Corollary 1. Under the KEA1 and DDH assumptions, the commitment scheme is non-malleable in the strong CRS model in the multiple-instance setting.
Before proceeding to the formal proof of Theorem 1, we point out some key-points that make the proof work. Suppose an adversary A in the MIM setting is given. Simulator S im generates independent CRS's for the left and right sessions with trapdoor information as specified in the scheme. A is invoked given the CRS. In order to prove nonmalleability, S im has to "simulate from the left and extract from the right" against A.
Simulate from the left: To simulate the left view of A without the knowledge of the real message m, S im as a left party commits to a dummy message m 0 for A through an equivocal commitment c using the trapdoor information as shown in Sect. 4.1. By equivocality, the commitment c cannot be distinguished from real commitments and it can be opened by the real message m instead of m 0 , later. This indicates that S im can correctly commit to m without the knowledge of m.
When doing an equivocal commitment, S im fakes a 1 , a 2 as shown in Sect. 4.1. We will show an equivocal commitment with the faked a 1 , a 2 is indistinguishable from a real one under the DDH assumption. Extract from the right: From the commitment c * generated by A, S im, as the simulated right party, can extract the committed message m * by using the trapdoor information and the suitable KEA1-extractors as descried in Sect. 4.2. Here, note that when A generated c * , A only knew an equivocal commitment c. So, m * must be independent of m. This means that S im can find m * without using m at all with the same probability that A outputs such m * in the real MIM setting. This means non-malleability of the commitment scheme.
Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose an adversary A against the scheme in the MIM setting and a nontrivial computable relation R on message space M is given (here, non-triviality of R means that R doesn't contain any reflexive pair (x, x)). In the following, we define six experiments Exp 0 , Exp 1 , · · · , Exp 5 below (for the full description of those experiments, see Appendix). Exp 0 is identical to the real experiment Exp real Com specified with our commitment scheme and Exp 5 is seen as the ideal experiment Exp sim Com specified with our commitment scheme and a suitable simulator derived from the adversary in Exp 0 (see Definition 1). In order to prove the non-malleability of the scheme, we need to show outputs of Exp 0 and Exp 5 
Lemma 3. G is LR-secure under the DDH and KEA1 assumptions on G.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, there is an adversary D LR with a non-negligible advantage against Game LR in G. We construct a DDH distinguisher D ddh with a nonnegligible advantage on G by using D LR and a suitable KEA1-extractor.
We prepare with an input g 0 , h 0 , g 1 , h 1 for D ddh as usual: 
with negligible exceptions. Let
It is directly verified that
Then, under Eq. (4), we have
Thus, we see that in the case of Eq. (4) We proceed to Exp 2 . The only difference between Exp 2 and Exp 1 is that the simulated left party in Exp 2 commits to a dummy message m 0 instead of m. However, since a 1 and a 2 are faked both in Exp 1 and Exp 2 , the com-
Hence Exp 2 is indistinguishable from Exp 1 .
We proceed to Exp 3 . The only difference between Exp 3 and Exp 2 is that we use, in the right session of Exp 3 , the simulator (S 1 , S 2 ) of the non-interactive zero-knowledge argument system Π = (l, P, V, S = (S 1 , S 2 )) instead of the real prover P (and don't use the witness b i ). By the zeroknowledge property of Π, Exp 3 is indistinguishable from Exp 2 .
We proceed to Exp 4 . The only difference between Exp 4 and Exp 3 is that we use the KEA1-extractor H * to extract the message n * under the adversary's commitment and output R(m, n * ) instead of R(m, m * ) in Exp 4 . The KEA1-extractor H * corresponds to the following KEA1-adversary H. Given u 0 , j 0 (= u b 0 0 ) and auxiliary input w (independent of b 0 ), H outputs u n * 0 , j n * 0 by simulating the MIM-setting against A: , m, g 0 , e 1 , d 0 , d 1 , σ,  t 1 , s 0 , s 1 , z, b 1 , z 0 , z 1 , m 0 , r 0 , a 1 ) ): 4 and send it to A, which in turn sends u *
as in Exp
In the above, the KEA1-extractor H * 1 in H corresponds to KEA1-adversary H 1 , which given u 1 , j 1 (= u b 1 1 ) and w 1 (independent of b 1 ), outputs u * 1 , j * 1 as follows: 4 and send it to A, which in turn sends u *
The KEA1-extractor H * 2 in H corresponds to KEA1-adversary H 2 , which given v 1 , k 1 (= v 
with only negligible exceptions. Similarly, a * 2 satisfies
with only negligible exceptions. Since m (2) and (3) in Sect. 4.2 together with Eqs. (5) and (6), we see that, if α, β (defined in the description of H) are not equal, u Proof. Assume, on the contrary, the case α = β happens with a non-negligible probability. We construct discretelogarithm extractor E as follows: 4 and send it to A, which in turn sends u * 
1 , v * 1 , j * 1 , k * 1 , M * 0 , M * 1 , L * 0 , L * 1 to R; a * 1 := H * 1 (u 1 , j 1 ; w 1 ); a * 2 := H * 2 (v 1 , k 1 ; w 2 ); (Here, w 1 = w 2 = (R A , m, g 0 , e 1 , d 0 , d 1 , σ, u 0 , v 0 , s 1 , z, j 0 , k 0 , z 0 , z 1 , m 0 , r 0 , a 1 )) is independent of b 1 .) Output s 1 a * 2 /a
Conclusion
We showed another efficient DL-based commitment scheme, which is proven to be non-malleable even in the multiple-instances setting, based on the KEA1 and DDH assumptions. Our scheme has a simulator that works in a straight-line manner by using the KEA1-extractor instead of the rewinding strategy. The KEA1 assumption enables our scheme's extractability not only without rewinding but also without having any system-wide master trapdoor. So, our scheme can avoid the catastrophic collapse of security possible by corrupting the third party providing the CRS. 
